Twoim problemem jest to, że powszechną NICOŚĆ mylisz z osobistą PUSTKĄ
University of Vienna
Democratic Transition, Political Culture and Social Change in Taiwan
Vienna, Austria
September 28-29, 2009
Consolidation of democracy and historical legacies: a case study of Taiwan
Christian Schafferer
Associate Professor
Department of International Trade
Overseas Chinese University
chris@ocu.edu.tw
Final Draft (September 2009)
First Panel Paper 3 Schafferer
Consolidation of democracy and historical legacies: a case study of Taiwan
Christian Schafferer
*
In political science there is broad interest in whether a newly established democracy
succeeds in overcoming the perils of democratisation and matures into a consolidated
democracy or regresses to authoritarianism. Taiwan was under martial law for almost
four decades. Democratic consolidation, therefore, is primarily a question of how to
overcome the legacies of the former authoritarian regime. Nationalism and
dysfunctional political institutions are some of the legacies that limit Taiwan’s
democratic development. The study of these destructive elements is important in the
attempt to interpret Taiwan’s most recent political history and to formulate effective
democracy-building policies. In the following, I would like to address the
aforementioned legacies and their implications for Taiwan’s current and future
democratic development.
1. Dimensions of democratic consolidation in Taiwan
In the late twentieth century, political scientists around the world focussed their
attention on the third occurrence of a global wave of democratisation in modern
history (Huntington 1991). The Wave toppled authoritarian regimes in all parts of the
world. Political analysts welcomed the new development and concluded that liberal
democracy had finally prevailed over all other forms of political governance
(Fukuyama 1992). However, a number of political 'crises' in newly established
democracies over the last few years and the humanitarian consequences of the US-
lead ‘War on Terror’ brought an end to this global euphoria and political analysts
subsequently predicted a global resurgence of authoritarianism (Diamond 2008,
Quimpo 2008).
In advanced democracies, the recent discourse on the contemporary crisis of
democratic development has mainly focussed on the ‘War of Terror’, its humanitarian
consequences and the justification thereof. The Asian discourse, on the other hand,
has tried to answer the question of whether democracy has failed in Asia and whether
it is appropriate for Asian societies to adopt Western democratic values and
institutions (Thompson 2008). As a matter of fact, all newly established democracies
in Asia have experienced some sort of political unrest in recent years. In each case,
however, the political turmoil has been the result of neglected historical legacies
rather than cultural barriers. Taiwan is no exception. Taiwan's political development
has given rise to a number of socio-political confrontations and 'crises' since the early
stages of its democratic development. I believe that these “crises” have predominately
been the result of historical legacies. Taiwan's current and future democratic
development depends on the society's ability to overcome these legacies. In this paper,
I assert that three different types of historical legacies that constitute three dimensions
of democratic consolidation in Taiwan. Ethnic and national identity constitute the first
*
Associate Professor, Department of International Trade, Overseas Chinese University, e-mail:
chris@ocu.edu.tw
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dimension. The second dimension comprises institutions, such as parliament, the
judiciary and media, and institutionalised processes, such as education, that were used
during authoritarian rule to control society and have not yet adapted themselves to the
new, democratic environment. The third dimension has to do with the authoritarian
mindset that still exists in elitist political circles and the authoritarian concept of
turning politics into popular culture. In the following, I would like to elaborate on
these three dimensions and how they have affected Taiwan's democratic development.
1.1 Han nationalism, Taiwanese nationalism and transitional justice
During World War II, the United States reached an agreement with President Chiang
Kai-shek providing that Taiwan would eventually be returned to China. Soon after the
war, Chiang Kai-shek appointed a committee headed by Chen Yi to take over the is-
land’s administration. The Taiwanese could not, however, identify with the new gov-
ernment and considered it a foreign regime that had come to Taiwan to “loot” the is-
land (Peng 1972, 61). The Chinese nationalist (KMT) government under Chiang Kai-
shek and later his son Chiang Ching-kuo promoted Han nationalism with the aim of
eventual “liberalization” of the Mainland. The future Han nation would consist of
“one state, one people, [and] one language” (Windrow 2005, 412).
As part of this at-
tempt, the KMT government was determined to assimilate the native population of
Taiwan through social control and education. The Han-nation building process se-
verely affected the daily lives of the native population. Regulations forbade the use of
Japanese, aboriginal and Sinitic languages other than Mandarin. Ethnic origin and the
ability to speak Mandarin worked as keys to power and became instruments of social
control. The KMT government purged state institutions of the local people, the Tai-
wanese, and within a few years the Mainlanders, the ethnic minority, held the major-
ity of key positions in government and state-run industries (Chen 2006, 110).
The Han nationalists justified the purges with the claim that the “primitive prostitute
culture” of the “local population” lacked the ability to govern the island (Windrow
2005, 411).
Social and political injustices caused by the Han-nationalists’ dogma of racial
superiority and widespread bureaucratic inefficiency led to the 228 Massacre of 1947,
in which Chiang Kai-shek’s troops brutally killed thousands of Taiwanese. Two years
later, the Han nationalists lost the Civil War on the mainland and retreated to Taiwan.
Martial law was imposed the same year and remained in effect until 1987. The defeat
on the mainland and Mao Ze-dong’s subsequent proclamation of the People’s
Republic of China, the de-facto and de-jure successor state of the KMT’s Republic of
China, caused a crisis of legitimacy for the Chiang Kai-shek regime. On the
international stage, the USA assisted Chiang Kai-shek in maintaining the myth that
the KMT government was the sole legitimate government of China (Lin 1986).
Domestically, the myth was kept alive by promoting Han nationalism and persecuting
any opponent thereof. The KMT regime under Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang
Ching-guo set up a network of informants to monitor the political and social activities
of co-workers, neighbours and even family members at home as well as abroad.
Secret police units, interrogation centres, political prison camps and execution
grounds existed throughout the island. Torture and (extra-judicial) executions were
widespread and systematic until the late 1970s. The total number of victims is
difficult to gauge, since a large number of executions were extra-judicial and thus
mostly without any records. According to declassified information, the majority of
extra-judicial executions were carried out in the 1950s, when about 130,000 people
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were reported missing.
1
As of today, there are over ten thousand well-documented
cases of gross human rights violations committed by the KMT regime.
2
Although the issue of transitional justice has been neglected by foreign academia,
it has shaped Taiwan's political landscape and emerged as one of the major obstacles
to further democratic development. Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, there have
been several different approaches as to how to deal with the atrocities. The first
attempt to address the past occurred during Lee Teng-hui's presidency. Lee Teng-hui,
a native of Taiwan, succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo after his death in 1988. Lee had a
close relationship with the former dictator, whom he considered his political mentor.
In his later writings, he notes that his succession was an accident caused by historical
circumstances rather than being the result of Chiang’s personal wishes (Lee 2004, 8-
10). Lee’s assessment based on the fact that he was neither a mainlander nor a staunch
supporter of Han nationalism. Many senior party figures were well aware of Lee’s
political leaning towards Taiwanese nationalism and they made several unsuccessful
attempts to oust Lee from the party leadership and the presidency (Zhou 1993; Lin
2004).
The immediate post-martial-law years saw a number of large-scale protests
demanding several groundbreaking political and social reforms. Although human
rights activists and victims of the KMT atrocities called for transitional justice,
President Lee started his term in office with a press conference merely stating that the
people of Taiwan “should not dig in the past.” Lee’s long-term career in the repressive
regime and his close friendship with the former dictator might have been the key
factors behind his refusal to address the past. With the conflict between Lee and the
conservative wing intensifying, Lee saw in public support the key to his political
survival, and he therefore increasingly presented himself as a statesman who would
“listen to the hearts of the people.” As to the issue of transitional justice, Lee had to
readjust his policies in such a way that he would neither neglect public opinion nor
endanger his political career as party leader and president. Lee thus publicly
apologized for the 2-28 Massacre and initiated a set of laws that would allow victims
to get financial compensation for the past wrongs of the Nationalist government, but
fell short of supporting any initiative that would encourage people to question the role
of the KMT and its leaders in the atrocities.
His successor had a rather different approach. Chen Shui-bian was the first
president of Republican China who was not a member of the Chinese Nationalist
Party (KMT). During the martial law era (1949-1987), he was a key participant in the
opposition movement. The international community thus praised Chen Shui-bian’s
victory in the presidential election of March 2000 as a major step forward in Taiwan’s
process of democratisation. As a former human rights lawyer, Chen put great
emphasis on improving the democratic environment. A large number of his
democracy-consolidating policies were related to transitional justice. The aims of his
government policies were to separate the State from the KMT, to make people aware
of the wrongfulness of the atrocities committed during the martial law era, to find
ways of reconciliation, and to set preventive measures. However, during his two
terms, the DPP government could only partially succeed in addressing the issue of
transitional justice by (see also Table 1):
Establishing a commission to investigate responsibility for the 2-28 Massacre
Drafting laws and holding a referendum on the return of KMT martial law
assets to the State
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Renaming Chiang Kai-shek International Airport and Chiang Kai-shek
Memorial
Removing Chiang Kai-shek statues
Closing Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo’s mausoleums
Rehabilitating victims’ reputations
Declassifying government documents related to human rights violations
Chen's transitional justice initiatives as well as other measures designed to improve
human rights standards encountered several constitutional and societal obstacles. As
to the first, the constitution vests very limited power in the president and thus a
president lacks means to push through legislation in a parliament where his or her
party does not enjoy a majority of seats. Throughout Chen's presidency, the Han
nationalists had a clear majority in parliament. Any piece of legislation thus needed
their support, which was unlikely primarily for two reasons. First, as pointed out
earlier, the major obstacle of Taiwan’s democratic consolidation is the KMT legacies.
However, removing the KMT legacies inevitably creates clashes with the KMT and
its staunch supporters. Second, Taiwan is confronted with an unfortunate and possibly
unique linkage between transitional justice and national identity. Since the lifting of
martial law in 1987, demands for transitional justice has mainly come from supporters
of Taiwanese nationalism and resistance to it from Han nationalists. Both groups
question the other’s understanding of transitional justice and harbour different views
on three important historical events (see Table 2), namely the 2-28 Massacre, the
White Terror and Japanese aggression during World War II.
As to the 2-28 Massacre, the Han nationalists do not deny its existence but
persistently claim that it was caused by “language barriers” and “some corrupt local
government officials.” Thus, neither the KMT nor Chiang Kai-shek could be held
responsible for the massacre. As to the atrocities committed during the White Terror,
key supporters of Han nationalism have either kept silent on the issue or justified the
offences by claiming that they were
“in accordance with the law and necessary as to protect Taiwan from
Communist infiltration. I don’t understand what all the fuss is about? They
[Taiwanese] should be grateful to Chiang Kai-shek and his son for protecting
Taiwan against the Communists and for turning Taiwan into an economic
miracle.”
3
Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo are therefore considered by the Han
to be heroic leaders who deserve a special place in world history. Every year,
thousands of Han nationalists (including the top leadership of the KMT) march to the
former dictators’ mausoleums to pay homage. Such deification amplifies their
conviction that the two dictators’ mausoleums and other places commemorating the
two dictators’ “achievements” should be protected by the State. Moreover, Han
nationalists tend to consider any attempt to close, remove, or rename those historic
sites as an act of treason.
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